By Madara Dias, MHR Program, University of Manitoba
Date: July 7, 2025
Introduction: From Maritime Power to Human Security
In Part 1 of this blog series, we examined the growing militarization, strategic
alliances, and infrastructure-led rivalries reshaping the Indo-Pacific. In this
second installment, we pivot to one of the most protracted and politically
sensitive humanitarian challenges in the region which consider as the Rohingya
refugee crisis in Bangladesh. More than a crisis of displacement, it is now a
test of Indo-Pacific diplomacy, regional security cooperation, and the future
role of small and medium states in managing complex emergencies.
The Rohingya Crisis: Humanitarian Emergency in a Strategic Theatre
As of mid-2025, nearly one million Rohingya refugees remain in Bangladesh, with
little progress made toward safe and voluntary repatriation. These refugees
reside in the world’s largest refugee camp complex in Cox’s Bazar, where they
face growing risks from malnutrition, trafficking, environmental hazards, and
camp violence. According to UNHCR, more than 95% of refugees rely entirely on
humanitarian aid, and food rations were cut to $8 per person per month in early
2024, worsening malnutrition, especially among children and pregnant women.
New threats such as cyclone damage, fires, and organized criminal networks
trafficking people to Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Middle East have emerged.
The camps, once viewed as temporary, are now sites of political fatigue and
diplomatic stagnation. This inaction contributes to instability and makes the
Rohingya vulnerable to extremism, exploitation, and statelessness, while also
complicating Bangladesh’s internal politics and regional diplomatic posture.
Myanmar’s Internal War and China’s Strategic Grip
Myanmar’s post-coup civil war has made repatriation of Rohingya refugees even more
implausible. The junta’s control over Rakhine State has weakened in the face of
Arakan Army offensives, leaving a power vacuum and escalating clashes that have
displaced tens of thousands more in early 2025.
Despite these tensions, Myanmar confirmed in April 2025 that 180,000 Rohingya refugees
could be eligible for return which is a gesture largely seen as symbolic rather
than actionable, given the security risks and lack of citizenship guarantees.
China remains Myanmar’s most influential external actor. Through the China–Myanmar
Economic Corridor (CMEC), an offshoot of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing
has secured control of the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, oil and gas pipelines, and
road infrastructure that enable strategic access to the Indian Ocean, bypassing
the Strait of Malacca. China’s consistent support of the junta, both
diplomatically and through arms sales, underscores its long-term interest in
securing maritime access and countering US and Indian influence in the region.
This entrenched engagement makes China a gatekeeper to any international peace
effort in Myanmar, while sidelining global institutions like the UN or ASEAN
from meaningful influence.
Bangladesh:
A Pivot State Under Pressure
Bangladesh, which has shouldered the Rohingya crisis since 2017, is now experiencing donor
fatigue, domestic backlash, and geopolitical balancing stress. While Dhaka
engages with China through BRI infrastructure, such as the Padma Bridge, Payra
Port, and railway links, it also cautiously entertains the US-led Indo-Pacific
Strategy (IPS), participating in defense dialogues like GSOMIA and ACSA.
This dual alignment places Bangladesh in a precarious position: dependent on foreign
aid for humanitarian assistance, and yet wary of becoming entangled in great
power rivalries.
A growing debate within Bangladeshi strategic circles revolves around the idea of
a “safe humanitarian corridor” in Myanmar’s Rakhine State is an initiative
floated in past Track II dialogues. Proponents argue this corridor could serve
as a bridge for peace, supported by neutral countries or UN mechanisms. But
critics warn of foreign military presence near the sensitive Chittagong Hill
Tracts, and possible violations of national sovereignty.
As General Mahfuz noted in a recent webinar hosted by the Conflict and Resilience
Research Institute Canada, Bangladesh lacks a “credible deterrence
capacity” and a strong strategic culture, which limits its ability to push
for repatriation or humanitarian diplomacy assertively.
Multilateralism and Canada’s Diplomatic Niche
Among Western actors, Canada has taken a value-based soft power approach, especially
under its Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022). Through its “Path to Lasting Peace in
Myanmar” project, Canada committed CAD $56.8 million between 2023 and 2025 to
support Myanmar civil society and provide Rohingya youth with skills training
and livelihood assistance. However, observers have criticized the lack of a
special envoy, as previously promised, to coordinate Canada’s engagement and
policy leadership in the crisis.
ASEAN, despite repeated declarations, has made little tangible progress. Its “Five
Point Consensus” with the Myanmar junta remains largely ignored. Malaysia,
Thailand, and Indonesia which are the countries directly affected by Rohingya
migration and have called for more assertive diplomacy. However, ASEAN’s
principle of non-interference continues to hamstring collective action.
The Rohingya issue demonstrates the need for a reimagined multilateralism, one
where soft power states like Canada, mid-tier actors like Japan and South
Korea, and ASEAN members coordinate efforts on repatriation, aid, and
accountability.
What Needs to Be Done: From Stalemate to Solution
To avoid indefinite limbo, key stakeholders must pursue a multi-pronged, practical
strategy:
- Reframe the crisis as regional:
Encourage ASEAN and BIMSTEC to integrate refugee issues into regional
disaster management, border stability, and health security agendas. - Empower Bangladesh diplomatically:
Equip Dhaka with negotiation support, legal frameworks, and UN-backed
repatriation templates that hold Myanmar accountable. - Establish humanitarian monitoring mechanisms: A third-party oversight group (possibly
involving Canada, Japan, and Malaysia) could monitor conditions in Rakhine
State and verify return readiness. - Invest in refugee self-reliance:
Shift some aid toward education, employment, and climate-resilient
infrastructure for both host and refugee populations to reduce dependency. - Hold perpetrators accountable:
Support ICC proceedings and targeted sanctions that apply consistent
pressure on Myanmar’s military leaders, regardless of geopolitical
discomfort.
Conclusion:
Regional Future Hinges on Local Justice
The Rohingya crisis is no longer an isolated tragedy, it is a regional challenge
embedded in the Indo-Pacific’s strategic logic. The policies of Beijing, New
Delhi, Washington, and Ottawa all intersect in the refugee camps of Cox’s Bazar
and the conflict zones of Rakhine State.
If ignored, the crisis could become a flashpoint for militancy, human trafficking,
and diplomatic fractures. But with coordinated regional effort, diplomatic
courage, and a shift from reaction to prevention, this challenge could become
an opportunity for inclusive cooperation.
As we navigate the Indo-Pacific crossroads, ensuring dignity, safety, and justice
for the Rohingya will define whether the region chooses confrontation or
collaboration as its guiding ethos.
Stay tuned for our next post, which will explore the future of refugee diplomacy and
Bangladesh’s evolving role in humanitarian leadership across South and
Southeast Asia.